The Cambodian silk weaving industry shows a remarkable pattern of ethnicised positions interlocked in processes of production and trade stretching beyond Cambodia into the Southeast Asian region and into Europe and the United States. Key commercial positions in the Cambodian silk trading networks are dominated by the Chinese, at least so it seems. In contrast to the bulk of literature on Chinese capitalism, the current study addresses a situation in which the commercial positions are identified as Chinese regardless of the ethnic background of the people who occupy them. While subscribing to the institutional perspective on Chinese capitalism, this article aims to take the debate one step further by arguing that -while a particular institutional embedding is conducive to Chinese proliferation in the business sector -Chinese business practices and representations are themselves subject to processes of institutionalisation. The paper explains how they may develop into an institution that is both a model of and for conducting business.
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Chinese affairs and Chinese "thrift and industry" represented a model for financial success (Edwards, 2007: 221) .
The revitalisation of the Cambodian silk weaving industry after the Pol Pot era is a case in point exemplifying the ways in which the "Chinese model" for business success became re-established in Cambodian society. The current silk industry builds on legacies that reach back into the 14th century when Chinese merchants and, in their wake, the revenue farm system for the production of silk took root in the Angkor kingdom. Throughout colonial times and into the 1960s the Chinese played a crucial role in the organisation of the silk production and trade in Cambodia. After its eclipse during the 1970s, silk weaving was resumed in a number of villages in the vicinity of Phnom Penh during the 1980s to develop into a significant industry in the 1990s. Today, silk is worn at ceremonial occasions both by royalty and commoners. However, the the bulk of silk products is purchased by international tourists visiting Cambodia, foreign professionals working for the many donor agencies and, increasingly, former refugees who return to Cambodia temporarily for family visits and acquire silk to resell in their host-countries (Dahles and Zwart, 2003) .
The Cambodian silk industry shows a remarkable pattern of ethnicised positions interlocked in processes of production and trade stretching beyond Cambodia into the Southeast Asian region and into Europe and the United States. Key positions in the organisation of the silk industry are dominated again by the Chinese, at least so it seems. Strikingly, the individuals that are moving into the commercial positions in the silk industry assume the identity markers that come with the position. In contrast to the bulk of literature on the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia where ethnic Chinese usually dominate in commercial positions, the current study addresses a situation in which the commercial positions are identified as Chinese regardless of the ethnic background of the people who occupy them. As will be shown in interviews below, the silk traders and wholesalers cultivate 4 a self-presentation that identifies them as Chinese. They are denoted as cen -literally "Chinese" but also the term used for commercial professions. Cen lead urban lives, dress in "Chinese" fashion, decorate their shops and homes with "Chinese" paraphernalia, celebrate
Chinese New Year and engage in gift giving and credit paying. 1 Silk weavers, on the other hand, lead rural lives, wear Khmer attire and observe Khmer holidays. If such a weaver is promoted to the position of trader or wholesaler, she becomes cen and assumes "Chinese" patterns of behaviour and expressions of self-identity. These Khmer and Chinese selfpresentations, one may argue, have to be viewed not as primordial affiliations or stateorchestrated ethnic arrangements, but instead as institutions rooted in the multilayered legacies of ethnic relations in Cambodia.
This article addresses the question as to how these multilayered legacies contributed to the establishment of the cen as an economic institution in Cambodian society. Empirically, this article deals with the role of institutional legacies in the ways in which the Chinese took and maintained control of key positions in the Cambodian silk industry. Theoretically, this article aims at contributing to the ongoing debate on "Chinese capitalism" or the striking congruence between the prominent Chinese presence and alleged success in the business sector. While subscribing to the institutional perspective on Chinese capitalism, this article aims to take the debate one step further. It will be argued that, while a particular institutional embedding is conducive to Chinese proliferation in the business sector, Chinese business practices and representations are themselves subject to processes of institutionalisation. As will be explained below, these practices and presentations may develop into an institution that is both a model of and a model for conducting business.
The empirical data on which this article is based are derived from the second author's dissertation research which focused on processes of negotiation and enactment of Khmer and Chinese identities in the Cambodian silk industry (Ter Horst, 2008) . The research revolved 5 around the mapping of networks constituting the Cambodian silk industry and the situational nature of ethnic self-representations among the actors involved in these networks. In the light of the explorative character of the research and its focus on sense-making, ethnographic fieldwork was the major methodology applied. This methodology offers an understanding of the social construction of meaning and interpretations "from within and from below" (see Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) . Moreover, this methodology is well suited for situations in which no direct questioning on sensitive matters is possible as is the case with ethnic origin in Cambodia (see Edwards, 2009: 177) .
This article is structured as follows. The next section offers a theoretical exploration of the institutional perspective on Chinese capitalism. The main body of the article consists of a description of the history and the current ethnicised organisation of the silk industry. The analytical section reconnects this ethnicised organisation with the institutional legacies of Chinese commercial hegemony in Cambodia. The article concludes with a brief outlook on the theoretical contribution of this article.
THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF CHINESENESS: A THEORETICAL EXPLORATION
In the 1990s, scholars of diverse disciplinary backgrounds involving themselves with the study of Asian economies and societies attempted to find plausible explanations for the spectacular rise of the "Tiger Economies" of East and Southeast Asia. Among the multitude of explanations produced to address the "Asian Miracle," a prominent role was assigned by some scholars to the business practices of the ethnic Chinese minority groups residing in these countries (cf. Chan, 2000; Gomez and Hsiao, 2004; Menkhoff and Gerke, 2002; Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996) . The ethnic Chinese were viewed as endowed with 6 exceptional entrepreneurial zest which -according to some scholars and business analystswas rooted in Confucian culture that the ethnic Chinese brought along when migrating from China to Southeast Asia (Fukuyama, 1995; Kotkin, 1993; Redding, 1990; Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996) . Hence, the image of the networking, family-based, guanxi-driven, 2 flexible, ethnic Chinese business has become a trope in the literature on transnational relations in contemporary Southeast Asia. Ethnic Chinese networks have been the spearheads of Asia's economic growth, as well as a major global force. Coupled with the capacity for hard work and trust based on blood ties and personal relations, these networks seem to distinguish "Chinese capitalism" from Western capitalism and seem to have engendered economic success where others have failed (Redding, 1990) .
However, as critics have pointed out, the homogenising assumptions of this so-called culturalist approach to Chinese capitalism ignore the experiences of Chinese communities and individual Chinese entrepreneurs under specific and widely differing economic and political conditions in the region (Suryadinata, 1997) . By focusing entirely on the ways in which ethnic identity shapes, even determines, economic practices and social life, the culturalist approach has come to essentialise ethnic identity and contribute to the "othering" of the Chinese as "perpetual outsiders" (see Chang, 2003) . Conversely, the "instrumentalist" approach deconstructs this image and focuses on how specific global, national and local economic arrangements present Chinese with business opportunities. Mutual interest, instead of a common ethnic identity, seems to characterise successful co-operative efforts among Chinese businesses within and across national borders (Gomez, 2002; Gomez and Hsiao, 2004) . Instrumentalist approaches to Chinese capitalism emphasise the accommodating character of business strategies among ethnic Chinese, in particular the conditions under which business deals are generated, negotiations are conducted, and co-operative ventures are settled (Gomez, 1999; Jesudason, 1989). 7 In this "culture versus instrumentalism" debate little attention has been paid to the role of institutional actors and structures shaping Chinese business activities in time and space.
The institutional approach to Chinese capitalism addresses the actor-structure relationship in its situational and contextual framework. Before elaborating this particular approach, a few words about the concept of institution are in order here. Institutions are generally defined as "systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions" (Hodgson, 2006: 2) , including social conventions (Searle, 1995) . Institutions are characterised by a high degree of resilience which imposes constraints on human action that at the same time can open up new opportunities. Institutions are perpetuated because they represent accepted models of conduct while, at the same time, these models offer compelling guidelines for proper behaviour and practice. Whereas individual actors are born and raised within pre-existing institutions which "reside in the dispositions of other individuals" (Hodgson, 2006: 8) , it is human agency that enacts these institutions and thereby both perpetuates and changes them. Despite their resilience, institutions are subject to processes of change "both incremental and discontinuous" (Scott, 2001: 48) .
In order to capture the simultaneously constraining and enabling impact of institutions on human action, institutional scholars introduced the concept of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990) . It has been argued that embedded economic activities such as in family-based businesses, trust-based reciprocal relationships, personalised or business networks, and business communities are useful institutional means of implementing co-operative strategies within and across national borders (Yeung and Olds, 2000: 15) .
Turning to ethnic Chinese businesses, embeddedness is provided by participation in business networks and communities, high levels of personal and social interaction among actors in these networks, collective representation through trade and commercial associations and informal business groupings, and patronage relationships with people in power (Yeung and 8 Olds, 2000: 15-16; Hamilton, 1991; . Ethnic Chinese businesspeople accumulate social capital by maintaining membership in a number of partly overlapping networks which enables them to evade failing vertical linkages. Guanxi-based trust is an expansive and inclusive principle contributing to the "institutional thickness" that characterises ethnic
Chinese business networks in a globalising business environment (see Chan and Tong, 2000: 74; Tan and Yeung, 2000: 240) . Such networks may comprehend ties with officials in institutional environments conducive to Chinese business, but they may also exclude such linkages and enable ethnic Chinese businesspeople to operate despite bureaucratic obstacles.
The institutional perspective contests essentialist arguments that culture, ethnic identities and value systems determine ethnic business activities. Instead, culture and ethnicity are viewed as abstractions of institutions that can be manipulated by governments, businesspeople and community organisations in the pursuit of their own goals.
A historical perspective enables scholars to understand the emergence and perpetuation of institutions, as "[h]istory provides the resources and constraints, in each case both material and cognitive, in which we think, act, and create" (Hodgson, 2006: 8) . The concept of "institutional legacies" addresses societal transformations as a function of the social, cultural, and institutional structures created under past regimes that persist in the present period. In this view the "past casts a long shadow on the present, shapes the environment in which the battle to define and defend new institutions takes place …" (Crawford and Lijphart, 1997: 2) . Proponents of this approach argue that dominant social, cultural, and political forces at work in the larger society are rooted in power struggles that evolved throughout history and currently shape the identity of new institutions (Crawford and Lijphart, 1997: 9) . In order to capture the dynamics of such processes, individual and collective actors have to be viewed not in terms of passive recipients of institutional resources "but as actors involved in both the construction and reconstruction of such resources within 9 and across national contexts" (Morgan and Quack, 2005: 1765) . Individual and collective actors that cross national borders have to deal with increasing diversity in both their organisational practice and institutional environment and may draw "on 'sleeping' nearly forgotten institutional legacies as a resource for their institutional change projects" (Morgan and Quack, 2005: 1765) .
Turning to the institutional legacies of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, the legendary entrepreneurial spirit of the ethnic Chinese is not a "given" cultural trait but an adaptation to life in the colonial and post-colonial economies where they were allocated positions that furthered the interests of the ruling elite -indigenous, colonial and national alike (Wee and Chan, 2006; Wee, Jacobsen and Tiong, 2006) . As McVey (1992: 18) However, it was this minority that came to dominate images of the "overseas Chinese" (Cohen, 1997; Kuhn, 2006) . This collective historical background generated discourses of the sojourner, the diasporic entrepreneur, the comprador, tax-farmer and middleman. However divergent, these positions imply limited opportunities for upward mobility as much as fresh openings stemming from new economic niches and capital accumulation. As one's livelihood is easily jeopardised in such a situation, the reliance on institutions such as family support, 10 reciprocal ties, networks and patronage relations attain crucial importance for risk reduction, economic consolidation and entrepreneurial venturing.
So far, the institutional perspective provides an understanding of the emergence, development and perpetuation of ethnic Chinese commercial activities in colonial and postcolonial Southeast Asia. However, the institutional approach has not yet addressed the disembedding of Chinese business practices from the ethnic Chinese community and its abstraction as a model for doing business in general. This article suggests that ethnic Chinese ways of doing business are becoming subject to processes of institutionalisation. In social theory the concept of institutionalisation refers to processes of social embedding within an organisation, system, or society as a whole (Scott, 2001: 15) . Tomlinson (2003: 272) ,
following Giddens (1990) , argues that modernity in particular facilitates the "abstraction of social and cultural practices from contexts of local particularity, and their institutionalisation and regulation across time and space." While Tomlinson positions such processes of institutionalisation predominantly in the domain of "cultural identity," institutional and organisational scholars observe that such processes also transpire in the organisational and business domain (e.g. Hatch and Schultz, 2004) . People "live" their occupational, professional and corporate identities as much as they live their gender, ethnicity and nationality "as publicly institutionalized, discursively organized belongings" (Tomlinson, 2003: 273) . As the remainder of this article will show, an institutional perspective on Chinese businesses in the Cambodian silk industry reveals the ways in which both long-standing and newly created institutional legacies are strategically employed, abandoned, even silenced and again revitalised under rapidly changing and ambivalent institutional regimes to culminate in the institutionalisation of Chineseness.
THE CAMBODIAN SILK INDUSTRY: A VERY BRIEF HISTORY
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There is only scant evidence about the origins of Cambodian silk weaving. Comparing traditional Indian attire with Khmer costumes on the Angkorean bass reliefs, textile experts argue that the Khmer ruling class of the 9 th to 14 th century adopted weaving techniques and finished products from India, Siam, and from South and Southwest China (Green, 2003 (Green, , 2004 Howard, 1999; Larsen, 1979) . In the "Age of Commerce" (1450-1680), with the arrival of the Chinese Ming fleets and its traders maintaining regular trade relations between China and mainland Southeast Asia the Cambodian kings moved the kingdom's capital city from inland Angkor to riverine Phnom Penh (Vickery, 2004) , which emerged as one of the flourishing port cities of South East Asia (Reid, 1993: 32) . Phnom Penh rapidly developed into one of the centres of Indochinese textile trade (Edwards, 2003: 16) . Here, as in many other cities in Southeast Asia, the Chinese came to constitute the commercially most active ethnic group (Igout, 1993: 5-6; Willmott, 1967: 28) .
In the mid-eighteenth century the southern Chinese districts of Shunde, Nanhai and Hsiangshan in the Pearl River delta were by far the largest silk producing regions in China (So, 1986) . By the 19 th century livelihoods in Southern China declined as a consequence of political and economic turbulence that led to an exodus of population. These exiles, among whom many Cantonese silk merchants, landowning gentry, and silk producers, often followed in the footsteps of earlier trade and migration flows (Kuhn, 2006; Miles, 2006) . The Shunde County silk producers established mulberry plots along the rivers of Tonle Sap,
Mekong and Bassac where they found the fertile ground for mulberry cultivation similar to their home county (So, 1986: 18-19) .
Cantonese silk merchants played a prominent role in the establishment of a silk industry in the riverine lowlands, investing in mulberry ventures and transplanting their silk enterprises to Cambodia. These Cantonese merchants encountered no indigenous competition 12 as they established their silk ventures in Cambodia. They organised the silk production locally by leasing thousands of hectares of mulberry plots from local peasants and involving thousands of rural households in the rearing of silk worms, spinning silk yarn and weaving silk fabrics (So 1986: 85-88) . At the same time, the Khmer kings entrusted Chinese merchants with both local and maritime trade. The kings -understanding that the Chinese brought wealth to their kingdom while seemingly not posing any political threat (Kuhn, 2006: 10) -leased lucrative revenue farms for opium and fishing to these merchants who established themselves in the kingdom as entrepreneurs, middlemen, tax-farmers and moneylenders (Willmott, 1967: 45) .
After the French had established a Protectorate over Cambodia in 1863 the possibilities of sericulture were investigated by colonial officials (see Henry, 1932; de Campocasso, 1923) . When exploring the Southern parts of Indochina, these officials observed an already flourishing silk industry along the banks of the Tonle Sap and the Bassac and Mekong rivers. The French were confident that the local silk producers constituted a potential workforce in their future silk ventures and French planters moved to Indochina to set up mulberry plantations (Frederico, 1997: 166-7) . The procurement of Chinese silk yarn was of crucial importance to the French silk industry which had been hit by a disease called pebrine, which had ravaged the livelihoods of some 70,000 silk farmers in Lyon (Frederico, 1997: 30) . No cure could not be found for this disease, and the only way to minimise the impact for the French silk producers was to buy silk worm eggs from unaffected areas. (Henry, 1932: 400) . As a 13 consequence La Compagnie had to contract Cantonese traders to collect the silk yarn from rural villages and to transport the yarn to Phnom Penh for shipment to France. These Chinese traders, however, played multiple roles, as they were often co-villagers and moneylenders of the rural silk spinners working for the French and, at the same time, members of the same dialect group as the Cantonese merchants and owners of silk spinneries in Phnom Penh (Forest, 1980: 304) .
In the early twentieth century, Chinese business was increasingly affected by restrictive colonial measures. A new taxation regime prohibited the Chinese from owning land or practicing a number of professions, and abolished tax farms (Willmott, 1967) . These measures forced the Chinese in Cambodia to revise their economic strategies. With mulberry plantations passing into French hands, the Chinese became subcontractors of the new owners organising the coolie labour and trade in raw silk (Henry, 1932: 400) . However, Cambodian sericulture was seriously affected by a worldwide fall of silk cocoon prices in the 1920s.
Coupled with the economic effects of the Great Depression, this "silk crisis" led to the collapse of the Cambodian silk industry, causing the bankruptcy of many French planters and mill owners. As a consequence, many Cantonese merchants had to give up their involvement in the silk industry and returned to China (Robequain, 1944: 43) ., When World War II swept across Europe and the Pacific disrupting the naval trade connections with France and all major Asian entrepôts, the Cambodian economy fell into a serious crisis characterised by serious food shortages and extreme poverty (Muan and Daravuth, 2003: 8) .
Following World War II the silk weaving industry underwent a revitalisation as the silk woven sampot hol -an ikat woven skirt, worn like a sarong -became a symbol of the struggle for Cambodian independence and of national identity (see Edwards, 2001 ). While the Chinese-dominated silk industry had been destroyed, Cambodian peasants resumed work at their handlooms, keeping up small-scale production for domestic use and for the modest 14 flow of tourists visiting the Angkor temple complex (see Delvert, 1961: 282-4 . During this period, all commercial activities, including silk production and trade, came to a halt (see Kiernan, 1986) . and Lao handicrafts for silk woven products (Ter Horst, 2008: 116) . The hand-woven silk found its way into refugee camps on the Thailand border, and from there, through the hands of returnee aid workers, into the overseas Cambodian exile communities (Ter Horst, 2008: 118) . With the first weavers at the loom, Chinese traders crossing borders and a market developing, the Cambodian silk industry was re-established, as the next section will show.
ORGANISING THE SILK INDUSTRY
As the previous section has shown, the Cambodian silk industry has been integrated in multi-layered transnational business networks for a long time. Currently, these networks comprise silkworm rearing farms and silk yarn producing factories in the Vietnamese borderlands, Cambodian silk weaving communities, urban-based wholesalers and retailers, middlemen provisioning of weavers with yarn and credit, and sampot wearing and silk retailing Cambodian exiles in Paris, Lyon or Long Beach. Silk threads connecting producers, traders and consumers across borders and continents are knotted together by institutions organising and regulating the silk industry. In contemporary Cambodia, current national demand for silk yarn is about 400 tons per year, less than five tons of which is met by local production with the rest being imported from China and Vietnam (Marks, 2010) . This means that silk weaving constitutes only a tiny sector of a much larger garment industry (see Rasiah, 2009; Arnold and Toh, 2010) .
In the silk industry, the relationships between weavers, wholesalers, middlemen and retailers are organised according to hierarchical and ethnic principles. This section will discuss the organisation of the current Cambodian silk industry from the perspective of its major actors and will identify the ways in which Chinese identity intervenes in this organisation.
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The Weavers
In present-day Cambodia, silk weaving occurs in the riverine rural areas, but shows the largest concentrations in four craft communities situated on the banks of the rivers In many lowland rural households, one or two looms are usually placed in the shade under the house that stands on stilts or poles, a space that weavers share with their cattle, poultry and all kinds of agricultural equipment. While men attend to the rice paddies and the fields, weaving is a women's task. As a consequence of the civil war associated with the end of the Khmer Rouge regime, a large number of rural households is headed by widows or divorced women (Dongelmans et al., 2005: 27) . While handloom weaving has been maintained as part of the household economy, sericulture had fallen into decay after independence, leaving the weavers dependent on imports of silk yarn from myriad of foreign countries, including Vietnam, Uzbekistan, China and Japan (Ter Horst, 2008: 144) .
The Wholesalers
Among the first to resume the silk yarn trade with Chinese-owned filatures across the Vietnamese border were five female traders from Takeo and Prey Veng silk producing and trading families that trace their genealogy to the Shunde county in the Pearl River delta.
These women inherited the silk trade business from their parents who had managed far-flung networks distributing raw silk from mulberry plantations in Kampot, Takeo and Prey Veng to French operated spinneries in Vietnam and to Phnom Penh and Bangkok markets. After the civil war, these women -some of whom were widowed or divorced -involved themselves in petty trade in all kinds of goods that trickled across the porous Thai and Vietnamese borders.
Silk yarn and sampot were among these goods. Initially the traders acted as intermediaries in the silk yarn trade which passed through Cambodia for lack of direct linkages between
Vietnam and Thailand. Gradually, however, they started to provide silk yarn to the reemerging Cambodian market.
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These five wholesalers came to control the entire silk yarn trade in Cambodia. They do so not as competitors but by operating a close-knit and far-flung Chinese business network. The common descent from southern China and the shared family background in Takeo province helped the re-establishment of business ties with middlemen from their own weaving villages in Takeo. In some cases, former Takeo weavers were sub-contracted as middlemen, with whom the wholesalers established long-term credit relationships. In the
1980, under Vietnamese control, the Cambodian government issued restricting measures on
Chinese business activities that were regarded as a threat to the exclusive role of the state as a regulator and revenue collector. The silk wholesalers, however, managed to establish close patron-client relationships with high-ranking Khmer state officials. In some cases these relationships were forged through marriage. As one of the wholesalers, established in a
Chinese courtyard house displaying the usual Chinese identity markers, related:
Before the war I was a merchant in Takeo The core business of these wholesalers is the import of silk yarn, mainly from
Vietnam, but also other foreign countries. The imported silk yarn is stocked up in the shops waiting to be resold to the Cambodian weaving communities and to Thai and other foreign customers. The redistribution of the raw silk is organised through networks of middlemen. To provide the silk weavers with raw material the wholesalers subcontracted some twenty middlemen each, who again sell a large part of the finished silk clothes to the same wholesalers, and a remaining bulk to retailers in the main markets of Phnom Penh (Ter Horst, 2008: 148) .
The Middlemen
In colonial times French agronomists observed the essential role that middlemen been playing for peasants and weavers in the rural hinterlands, supplying them with a variety of goods (silk yarn, dye-stuff and loom materials) and services such as bulking, storing, transporting and credit supply (see Delvert, 1961) . Currently, about 100 middlemen operate in the silk weaving industry, with 30 to 50 larger operators dominating the sector, providing silk yarn to some 20,000 silk weavers. In turn, these big middlemen are closely related to one 20 of the five wholesalers in Phnom Penh. A survey by Dongelmans and colleagues (2005) shows that only 19% of the silk weavers can afford to pay directly for the silk yarn, which means that almost all weavers are in constant debt to their middlemen. As a result, large numbers of weavers are controlled by a few big middlemen. Their exclusive relationship with the Phnom Penh wholesalers providing a guaranteed market for their merchandise and the debt relationship with weavers who obtain silk yarn on credit propels these middlemen in a powerful position.
The close-knit texture of the silk industry comprising of co-operating wholesalers and close-knit ties between wholesalers and middlemen holds the industry in a firm grip. Hence the silk sector evolved into a closed system, which one can only enter on the basis of "trusted" social relationships. These relationships are said to be based on guanxi and entail mutual visits to each others' homes at particular festive occasions such as birthdays, marriage, funerals or special marked days of the Chinese or Khmer calendar (Ter Horst, 2008: 192 ff) . These visits take on a particular meaning if the powerful wholesaler comes to the home of a middleman. This is not only a particular honour paid to the middleman, but also implies a check on their reputation as creditworthy businesspeople, as members of the local rotating credit systems, and the respect they enjoy in their community, among the weavers, and the local officialdom. Middlemen are most literally "brokers" between two "worlds": the rural household economies that are defined as "typically" Khmer and the urban lifestyles of the "Chinese" As descendents of the weaver class, the middlemen were socialised as ethnic Khmer.
Moving into the role of intermediary, many ambitious middlemen started to copy the lifestyle of the wholesalers and built a new courtyard house outside the village adorned with red lampions, good-luck stickers, and a Chinese shrine and displaying Chinese newspapers, a
Chinese calendar and Chinese brand goods. They came to dress in Chinese style when travelling to the city and celebrate Chinese New Year. The "Chinese" lifestyle radiated symbols of business success and power, while the middlemen lacked knowledge of the Chinese language, could not read the Chinese newspapers and calendars and also had no clue who the deities on their shrines were, and what position they had in the Chinese pantheon of gods. As a silk weaver remarked: "No, of course they are not Chinese; they were weavers just like me and know nothing about the Chinese culture. But now they are middlemen, they must be cen" (Interview, September 2004).
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Retailers and Markets
As 
INSTITUTIONAL LEGACIES OF THE CHINESE
The Chinese dominance in commercial positions in the Cambodian economy is embedded in the pre-colonial legacies of early Chinese migration and settlement, as has been shown in a previous section. Scholars who studied the history of the Chinese in Cambodia speak of "assimilation" through intermarriage with Khmer people (Willmott, 1967: 28) and "cultural tolerance and mutual exchange" (Edwards, 2003: 8) when describing the position of the Chinese in the Cambodian kingdom before colonialism.
Conversely, the colonial state created a legacy that facilitated the institutionalisation of ethnic differences. By organising the economy along ethnic lines and carving out specific economic niches for different ethnic groups, the French laid the groundwork for a persistent ethnic divide. Under the French, Cambodian citizenship became an exclusive attribute of Khmer people; all Chinese (also those born in Cambodia) and Sino-Khmer were classified as "Chinese" (Willmott, 1967: 75-76) . Conversely, the Khmer were celebrated as the authentic creators of the great Angkor kingdom, toiling the soil in subsistence fashion and paying tribute to their king. The Chinese were branded as economically necessary but culturally polluting aliens useful only in -and therefore confined to -the commercial trades (Edwards, 2007: 140) . This was the onset of an imagined division of labour in the silk industry where only Khmer people were deemed capable of producing authentic silk that constituted the appropriate attire at Khmer festivals and the court under Khmer dress code. Therefore, and in order to avoid the colonial authorities' questioning the ownership of their plots, the Sino-
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Khmer weavers silenced their partial Chinese descent and melted into the Khmer rural life. In the silk industry, the Chinese were deemed to act -in their classical role of traders and middlemen -only as distributors, not as producers, of the silk-woven products across the kingdom and beyond.
When Cambodia became independent in 1953, Chinese people could become Khmer under a new naturalisation law, but the colonial legacy of ethnic divisions survived. The
Chinese had secured their economic wealth and influence despite inhospitable colonial policies (Willmott, 1998: 146) . In the towns their economic activities were rather diverse and (Edwards, 2007: 200; Willmott, 1998: 147) . Finally, images of pure Khmerness in terms of a land-toiling peasantry exempt from the repression by the commercial class were at the root of the revolution leading to the establishment of the brutal Khmer Rouge regime. Chinese were either forced to "become Khmer" in terms of housing, dress, language and food (assuming a rural lifestyle and disposing of tokens of their Chinese descent), or eliminated as representatives of the much hated capitalist class (Edwards, 2007: 201-2) .
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Under Vietnamese occupation, the post-colonial legacy of anti-Chinese policies and sentiments merged with cold-war rhetoric (Edwards, 2003: 30) . In an absurd denial of Chinese suffering, the ethnic Chinese were accused of having backed the Khmer Rouge, an accusation that was to legitimise repressive measures against Chinese businesspeople (Gottesman, 2003: 183) . The peddling careers of the five Sino-Khmer women operating in the Cambodian province and border lands in the 1980s, the women who rose to great wealth and power as silk wholesalers in the 1990s, may be illustrative of the failure of such measures to change the dependence on private Chinese enterprises in the Cambodian economy (Gottesman, 2003: 186) . However, these measures enforced the silencing of Chinese identity that has commenced in the 1960s. It was only after the 1991 Paris Accords and the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces that Chinese festivals were allowed again, the Association of Chinese Nationals in Cambodia (ACNC) was established and Chinese New Year was celebrated in public (Willmott, 1998: 148) . The end of conflict left Cambodia with an economy that relies on foreign assistance.
As critical observers argue, massive amounts of aid turned out counter-productive for development as it weakened institutional capacity (Ear, 2007) . Domestic companies do not participate much in terms of investments and exports, the more so as the government falls short of providing effective law-enforcement, a reliable system of state revenue collection, and overall trust in the state apparatus (Hughes, 2002; Kent, 2006 (Gottesman, 2004: 175-6) . The re-emergence of Chinese businesses in Cambodia exemplifies that it is not ethnicity per se or the inherent Chinese character of capitalism that spawned private sector initiatives. Instead, the institutional legacies of family linkages and common decent, reciprocity and guanxi, networks and patronage relations provided flexibility and resilience in the opaque and insecure environment of the post-conflict economy. In the silk sector, among those who were able to draw on some measure of "institutional thickness" were the widowed Sino-Khmer female peasants who took to their hand-looms to earn a living and the descendants of former middlemen and traders who resumed pushing goods across the closed but porous Cambodian borders. Other commercial initiatives originate through remittances and direct investments among Sino-Cambodiansexiles and former refugees -residing abroad (Dahles and Ter Horst, 2006) . In particular, While ethnicity seems to have become disembedded from its social meaning in the ethnically mixed Cambodian society, it has gained importance in the economic realm where occupational identities have become institutionalised according to essentialised ethnic formats derived from the legacies of the past.
It was modernity that was the harbinger of "Chineseness"-or ethnic Chinese identityamong Chinese migrants living scattered across Southeast Asia. With the rise of the modern society in the shape of the colonial state, the culturally diverse population of Southeast Asian kingdoms became classified in separate ethnic groups with majority and minority statuses affixed and well-policed boundaries established. In the late capitalist era, characterised by a global economy consisting of far-flung but interconnected and rapidly changing sites of doing business, the principles of ethnic Chinese business networks turn out to be more than just a trope. The "celebratory narratives of Chinese business success" referred to be Nonini and Ong (1997: 21) 
